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Archive for April 2010

Why be barefoot?

I’ve recently decided to be barefoot as often as I can.  This includes being barefoot at home, when I’m outside, when I’m going for my run, when I’m at the grocery store, when I’m at restaurants….all the time.  It turns out this is not the kind of thing you can do without people giving you hell about it.  So, I felt like publishing this…a manifesto of sorts. Read the rest of this entry »

Two posts I want to write in the near future, and a silly question about deodorant

Here are three nascent ideas.  Well…two nascent ideas.  The third is just a little bit of silliness.  But the first two, they’re ferreal…potential blog posts, potential papers, potential considerations that could figure into a broader position on relativism, perspectivalism, and the relationship between the two.

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What the first-personal-perspectival-realist might say about ‘disagreement’.

Last night, my buddy Joe wanted to know what disagreement among persons over first-person perspectival facts looks like for the metaphysician that wants to be a realist about such facts.  I think I gave a bad answer.  So I’m going to try again.  In particular, I want to try to make the point by exploiting an analogy that I am increasingly impressed with: the analogy between modal, temporal, and first-personal perspectives.

First, here’s the thesis.  Perspectives are sets of facts.  Sets of facts disagree when some propositon is in one set and its negation is in the other.  Two first personal perspectives disagree if some proposition is true from one perspective and its negation is true from the other.  This is disagreement among perspectives and it is (if I can get away with saying this) a metaphysical phenomenon.  It is distinct from conversational disagreement, such as two people arguing or debating over whether a proposition is true.  However, it’s plausible that faultless disagreement of the sort exploited by contemporary analytic relativism arises when conversational disagreement is over metaphysical perspectival disagreement of the sort I will be outlining here. Read the rest of this entry »

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